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Perspectives
The Perfect Spill: Solutions for Averting the Next
Deepwater Horizon
by Robert Costanza, David Batker, John W. Day, Jr., Rusty A. Feagin,
M. Luisa Martinez, and Joe Roman
“If we refuse to take into account the full
cost of our fossil fuel addiction—if we
don’t factor in the environmental costs
and national security costs and true
economic costs—we will have missed
our best chance to seize a clean energy
future.”
—President Barack Obama,
Carnegie Mellon University,
June 2, 2010

The oil spill from the Deepwater
Horizon has caused enormous
economic and ecological damage.
Estimates of its size and impact
continue to escalate, but it is now
the largest in U.S. history and clearly
among the largest oil spills on
record.1
As efforts to clean up the damages
and compensate injured parties

continue, it is not too soon to begin
to draw lessons from this disaster. We
need to learn from this experience
so we can prevent future oil spills,
reevaluate society’s current trajectory,
and set a better course.
One major lesson is that our
natural capital assets and other
public goods are far too valuable
to continue to put them at such
high risk from private interests. We
need better (not necessarily more)
regulation and strong incentives to
protect these assets against actions
that put them at risk. While the
Obama administration’s requirement
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In this satellite image, oil in the Gulf of Mexico reflects sunlight back into space. (Some of the reflection could be caused by plankton blooms or other
features.)
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Oil from the Deepwater Horizon accident has reached the Loop Current in the Gulf of Mexico, which goes through the Florida Straits before feeding into the
Gulf Stream current.

that BP contribute to a trust fund
to compensate injured parties is
appropriate, it arrived only after the
fact. Common asset trusts and new
financial instruments like assurance
bonds would be better able to shift risk
incentives and prevent disasters like
the Deepwater Horizon.

The Costs: Damages to
Natural Capital Assets
The spill has directly and indirectly
affected at least 20 categories of
valuable ecosystem services in and
around the Gulf of Mexico. The $2.5
billion per year Louisiana commercial
fishery has been almost completely
shut down. As the oil extends to
popular Gulf Coast beaches, the
loss of tourism revenue will also
be enormous. In addition, the spill
has damaged several important
natural capital assets whose value
in supporting human well-being is

both huge and largely outside the
market system. These non-marketed
ecosystem services include climate
regulation via the sequestration of
carbon by coastal marshes and open
water systems, hurricane protection
by coastal wetlands,2 and cultural,
recreational, and aesthetic values.
Since the time of the Exxon Valdez
spill, we have developed better
techniques to estimate the value of the
damage to these public assets.
A recently released study
estimated the total value of these
ecosystem services for the Mississippi
River Delta to be in the range of
$12–47 billion per year.3 Based on the
flow of these services into the future,
the value of the Delta as a natural asset
was estimated to be in the range of
$330 billion to $1.3 trillion, far more
than the total market value of BP ($189
billion) before the spill. Unlike BP,
ecosystem service values are outside
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the market. They continue to produce
benefits unless an action like the spill
damages them.
The value of the loss of these
ecosystem services for the entire Gulf
will always be difficult to estimate
with any precision. In addition to the
Mississippi Delta, the spill will also
probably affect a large fraction of the
Gulf’s open water systems and the
coasts of all of the states and nations
bordering the Gulf: Florida, Alabama,
Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and
perhaps even Mexico and Cuba. Once
the extent of the damages has been
assessed, we will have a better idea of
these costs. In the meantime, the best
we can do is to try to put the expected
magnitude of the damages in rough
perspective.
If we assume that the Mississippi
River Delta will be the most affected
region and that there will be a 10 to
50 percent reduction in the ecosystem

Perspectives
services provided by the Delta, this
amounts to a loss of $1.2–$23.5 billion
per year into the indefinite future
until ecological recovery, or $34–$670
billion in present value (at a 3.5
percent discount rate).

Dealing with Risk
Our current approach to dealing
with the risk of private interests
damaging public environmental assets
is to assign liability to the private
interests, but with the burden of
proof on the public. The public must
demonstrate damages after the fact,
claim compensation, endure a lengthy
judicial process, and finally hope to
recover just reparations. In addition,
the total liability is often limited. For
example, in the U.S., the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 limits the liability for oil
spills to $75 million,4 and the PriceAnderson Act limits the liability for
nuclear power plant accidents to $10
billion. The Exxon Valdez oil spill
resulted in an estimated $3.4 billion
in fines, compensation, and cleanup
costs, and a court settlement of $2.5
billion in punitive damages that took
decades of lawsuits after the incident
and was ultimately reduced by the
Supreme Court to $500 million in
2008.5
In many other parts of society,
we require private interests to buy
insurance to deal with the risks they
impose on the public. For example,
purchasing automobile insurance is
now mandatory, and assurance bonds
are often required from building
contractors. Requiring assurance
bonds or insurance forces private
interests to internalize the risk of their
activities before any damages occur. It
gives them strong financial incentives
to reduce risk, since it is their own
money that they stand to lose.
The Deepwater Horizon incident,
like the banking crisis, resulted
from inadequate attention to the

risks that the public was left to bear.
Precautionary measures were known
but not taken. Investments in safety
devices (like the acoustic blowout
preventer) were not made. Corners
were cut. Short-term private profits
motivated taking high risks with
public assets.
The fundamental problem is that
while private interests are ultimately
liable for damages to public assets,
they are only held accountable long
after the fact and only partially.
This gives private interests strong
incentives to take large risks with
public assets—far larger than they
should from society’s point of view.
If society does not change
investment incentives, private
interests will continue to devote vast
sums of capital to pursue increasingly
risky oil reserves (or financial
products) that provide less net energy
and maintain our oil addiction—an
addiction which simply cannot be
physically sustained.

The Solutions
The long-term solutions to these
problems require fundamental
changes to business-as-usual practices,
including:
1. Assessment and incorporation of
the full value of public natural
capital assets into both corporate
and public accounting and
decision-making, as President
Obama recommended.
2. Assessment of the risks and worstcase damages that could result
from accidents, based on damages
to this more broadly assessed value.
3. Application of the best science
available about the complex
linkages between human systems
and the rest of nature.
4. Reversal of the burden of proof
and requirement of corporations
and other private interests to

internalize and monetize their
risks to public goods. One way to
monetize these risks would be to
require private interests to post an
“assurance bond” large enough to
cover the worst-case damages.6-8
Portions of the bond (plus interest)
would be returned if and when the
private interests could demonstrate
that the suspected worst-case
damages had not occurred or
would be less than was originally
assessed. If damages did occur,
portions of the bond would be
used to rehabilitate or repair the
environment and to compensate
injured parties. The critical feature
is that the risk to the public asset is
apparent to the private interests in
financial terms before the fact, not as
a liability that may or may not be
enforced after the damage occurs.
5. Finally, it is high time government
policy realigned investment
incentives for both public and
private investment away from
greater oil dependency and toward
renewable domestic energy
sources. Environmental bonding is
a good start.
Imagine how this system might
have worked had it been in place prior
to the Deepwater Horizon incident.
What actually occurred is pretty
close to the “worst-case” scenario that
might have been envisioned before the
fact. Our best guess of the potential
damages would thus be in the range
of $34–$670 billion, as discussed
above. Let’s say that a scientific review
panel, after assessing the risk in more
detail, settled on an estimate of $50
billion. This immediately makes it
very apparent to BP and others drilling
in deep water in the Gulf of Mexico
that they are engaged in a very risky
business—several orders of magnitude
riskier than the $50 million liability
limit previously in force. The size of
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this bond, for one deepwater well,
would be close to one quarter of the
total value of the company! What
could they do? Either not drill at all
or find ways to reduce the size of the
risk and the bond. They might be able
to do this very cost-effectively if they
spent some money on risk-reduction
procedures or technology, such as the
acoustic blowout preventer costing a
mere $500,000. These measures might
convince the scientific review panel
to change its assessment of the worstcase scenario and reduce the bond.
There would be very strong economic
incentives for BP to find creative ways
to reduce the risks (just what we want
them to do!) rather than ignoring the
risks and cutting corners.
How could such a system be
implemented? A public agency would
need to be appointed as “trustee”
for the natural capital assets at risk.
This could be a branch of an existing
government agency or it could be a
new quasi-governmental organization
or non-governmental organization set
up as an independent “common asset
trust.” In any case, the mission of the
agency would be explicitly to “protect
the asset” rather than facilitating its
exploitation, and it would have the
authority to charge fees for damages to
the asset and require posting bonds to
cover potential damages.9-11
This change in approach to
risk should be extended to several
other private activities that put the
public interest at risk. Nuclear power
should be required to be fully insured.
Repealing the Price-Anderson Act

that currently limits liability and
requiring bonds to adequately cover
accidents and future waste disposal
costs would accomplish this. It would
reveal that nuclear power is extremely
expensive. The banking crisis would
never have occurred if the banks had
been required to internalize their
risks rather than literally “banking
on them.” We need to reassert the
public-goods nature of money and
put control of the money supply
back in the hands of the government
rather than the private banks, which
currently create most of the money
supply by issuing loans on fractional
reserves.12 Recapturing “seigniorage,”
the government’s right to control the
money supply, could enable a dramatic
reduction in taxes.
The Deepwater Horizon incident
offers a strong lesson in risk
management. Our entire society is
taking far too many risks with public
assets whose real value we are only
now beginning to recognize. By
shifting the financial burden of those
risks onto the private interests who
benefit from them, we can establish
the right incentives, shift investment
to less risky, more productive pursuits,
and create a more sustainable and
desirable future.
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